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█ Abstract Fodor’s view of the mind is thoroughly computational. This means that the basic kind of mental 
entity is a “discursive” mental representation and operations over this kind of mental representation have 
broad architectural scope, extending out to the edges of perception and the motor system. However, in 
multiple epochs of his work, Fodor attempted to define a functional role for non-discursive, imagistic rep-
resentation. I describe and critique his two considered proposals. The first view says that images play a 
particular kind of functional role in certain types of deliberative tasks. The second says that images are 
solely restricted to the borders of perception, and act as a sort of medium for the fixing of conceptual ref-
erence. I argue, against the first proposal, that a broad-scope computationalism such as Fodor’s renders 
images in principle functionally redundant. I argue, against the second proposal, that empirical evidence 
suggests that non-discursive representations are learned through perceptual learning, and directly inform 
category judgments. In each case, I point out extant debates for which the arguments are relevant. The 
upshot is that there is motivation for limited scope computationalism, in which some, but not all, mental 
processes operate on discursive mental representations. 
KEYWORDS: Computational Theory of Mind; Mental Representation; Perception; Mental Image; Jerry 
Fodor 
 
█ Riassunto Fodor e le rappresentazioni mentali come immagini – La concezione della mente di Fodor è ri-
gorosamente computazionale, ossia le entità mentali di base sono rappresentazioni mentali “discorsive”. Le 
operazioni su queste rappresentazioni hanno un fine architettonico ampio, che va fino ai confini della per-
cezione e del sistema motorio. In periodi diversi del suo lavoro, Fodor ha proposto due modi per definire 
un ruolo funzionale per la rappresentazione non-discorsiva come immagine. Tratterò criticamente en-
trambi. Per il primo, le immagini giocano un particolare tipo di ruolo funzionale in certi tipi di compiti 
deliberativi, mentre, per il secondo, sono relegate unicamente ai confini della percezione, agendo come 
medium per fissare il riferimento concettuale. Contro il primo sosterrò che un computazionalismo così 
ampio come quello di Fodor rende le immagini in principio funzionalmente ridondanti. Contro il secondo 
sosterrò che l’evidenza empirica suggerisce che le rappresentazioni non-discorsive vengono apprese per-
cettivamente, agendo direttamente sui giudizi di categorizzazione. In entrambi i casi considererò gli ar-
gomenti più rilevanti nel dibattito corrente. Si vedrà che ci sono buone ragioni in favore di un computa-
zionalismo più limitato, in cui alcuni processi mentali (ma non tutti) operano su rappresentazioni mentali 
discorsive. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Teoria computazionale della mente; Rappresentazione mentale; Percezione; Immagine 
mentale; Jerry Fodor 
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█  1 Introduction 
 
FODOR’S INFLUENCE ON PHILOSOPHY of 
mind is so widespread and so fundamental 
that it is often not directly acknowledged. I 
want to focus on just one issue in this essay – 
the role, if any, of non-propositional, imagis-
tic representations within a generally (classi-
cal) computational approach to the mind. In 
Fodor’s foundational work, the Language of 
Thought,1 he considered, without clearly dis-
tinguishing them, two possible roles for such 
representations. First, they might be useful in 
certain kinds of problem solving. Second, 
they might provide a non-conceptual input 
for fixing the referents of concepts. 
I think that there are major problems with 
both posited roles, but as often is the case, 
critiquing Fodor’s stated views is formative. 
His admirable forthrightness in articulating 
his assumptions and commitments, and clari-
fying the scope of his positions, provides es-
pecially clear targets and contrasts for alter-
native views. I will argue, against the first 
proposal, that a computationalism as thor-
ough-going as Fodor’s leaves no distinctive 
role available for perceptual representation 
in reasoning. This explains why he largely 
abandoned the proposal in later work. The 
second proposal, however, runs into empiri-
cal problems, because there is evidence that 
non-discursive representations directly in-
form judgments and categorizations, which 
Fodor takes to be thoroughly conceptual 
processes. 
The result of the analysis is that there is 
strong reason to accept hybrid accounts of cog-
nitive architecture.  Some mental processes op-
erate on discursively structured propositional 
representations, some on perceptual and motor 
representation, and some on their interaction, 
but genuinely mental function is not restricted 
to any one form of representation. 
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I articu-
late the central commitments of Fodor’s com-
putationalism. In section 3, I exegetically con-
struct and criticize the first view, as Fodor lays 
it out in The language of thought (LOT). In 
section 4, I construct and critique the pro-
posal, first raised in LOT and then furthered 
in Langauge of thought 2 (LOT2),2 that imagis-
tic representations are only inputs to concep-
tual processing. In each of these sections I 
briefly point to current discussions for which 
the arguments are relevant. In section 5, I 
conclude by discussing the possibility of “hy-
brid” accounts of cognitive architecture, 
which genuinely embrace rich functional roles 
for non-propositional representation.   
 
█  2 Core commitments 
 
In this section, I will articulate what I take 
to be the central commitments of Fodor’s 
approach.  For exegetical reasons, I will stick 
primarily to the formulations in LOT, with 
some moderate extensions. This is because I 
take these commitments to be ones that 
Fodor never relinquished. I will note paren-
thetically places elsewhere in his corpus 
where Fodor takes up similar themes. 
 
█  2.1  Computationalism 
 
Fodor’s computationalism is based on the 
notion of syntactically structured mental rep-
resentation. Computationalism is a view 
about both mental entities and processes. 
Mental entities are mental representations, 
and these are individuated according to their 
formal and semantic properties – a mental 
representation is a syntactically structured 
object that has a content.  In this sense, men-
tal representations are akin to linguistic 
statements; this is, of course, Fodor’s guiding 
metaphor. To be syntactically structured is to 
be predicative, to attribute some property to 
an object. The content of a representation is 
its extension. Mental processes are infer-
ences, which manipulate mental representa-
tions in virtue of their syntactic properties. A 
mental process transitions from given sym-
bols to others according to a rule or function. 
Comptuationalism underlies many other 
aspects of Fodor’s overall picture, including 
his naturalism, his anti-reductionism, and his 
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propositional attitude realism. I can only 
touch on these briefly here, but they are 
worth mentioning. According to Fodor, 
computation is the only kind of process we 
know of that is both naturalistic and genu-
inely inferential. Since inferences operate in 
virtue of the formal properties of representa-
tions, and since these properties ultimately 
are grounded on the physical states and tran-
sitions of the system, inferences are a proper 
part of physical causation. However, inferen-
tial processes are massively multiply realiza-
ble, guaranteeing the autonomy of psycho-
logical theory. Moreover, since propositional 
attitudes are themselves syntactically struc-
tured representations, and since folk psy-
chology takes behavior to be the result of in-
ferences over attitudes, a naturalistically ko-
sher story can be told of how propositional 
attitudes cause behavior. 
These joint commitments justify a kind of 
explanatory approach for Fodor, which takes 
propositional reasoning with folk psycholog-
ical attitudes as the paradigm example of a 
mental process, and psycholinguistic data as 
the primary source of data about the lan-
guage of thought. 
Fodor does not think that every mental 
process operates on traditional folk psycho-
logical states like beliefs and desires. And he 
stresses continuously that the language of 
thought is not just a natural language, be-
cause these are neither coextensive nor onto-
genetically similar. (That is, the language of 
thought is expressively richer than any natu-
ral language, and is innate whereas natural 
languages are learned.) But we are justified, 
according to Fodor, in starting from proposi-
tional reasoning and linguistic data and then 
expanding out from there. 
These commitments are summed up nice-
ly in the final chapter of LOT: 
 
Mental states are relations between or-
ganisms and internal representations, and 
causally interrelated mental states succeed 
one another according to computational 
principles which apply formally to the 
representations. This is the sense in which 
internal representations provide the do-
mains for such data processes as inform 
the mental life. It is, in short, of the es-
sence of cognitive theories that they seek 
to interpret physical (causal) transfor-
mations as transformations of infor-
mation, with the effect of exhibiting the 
rationality of mental processes.3 
 
█  2.2  The broad scope commitment 
 
I will call the second commitment the broad 
scope commitment. For Fodor, computational-
ism’s scope is broad both phylogenetically, ap-
plying to any kind of minded organism, and 
architecturally, applying to all processes worth 
describing as mental. Indeed, they approach 
being definitive of the mental. It is having men-
tal representations and performing rule-based 
inference which distinguishes the behavior of a 
minded thing from the behavior of, say, a plan-
et on its orbit.4 The architectural scope is pri-
marily what we’re concerned with here. To 
the extent that all mental processes are infer-
ential, and to the extent that inference is best 
modeled as rule-based manipulation of sym-
bols, «cognition is saturated with rationality 
through and through».5 Hence, computation-
alism applies both to more paradigmatically 
rational processes, such as decision-making, 
and to less paradigmatic ones like perception 
and motor control. 
To take a couple of examples.  For Fodor, 
decision is a (well,) decision-theoretic process.  
It involves explicit representation of one’s be-
liefs about the world, including hypotheticals 
about what outcomes will result from what 
behaviors, as well as explicit representation of 
one’s desires, including a preference ordering 
over outcomes. When one calculates what to 
do, one applies a decision-rule defined over 
these representations – i.e., one’s decision is a 
“function”6 defined over these representations 
– and what one intends to do is to enact the 
behavioral option that is the output of the de-
cision rule. In another important example, 
Fodor construes concept learning as «essen-
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tially a process of hypothesis formation and 
confirmation».7 When one learns a concept, 
one learns a rule that applies to the instances 
with which one is acquainted, and also applies 
to any other member of the concept’s exten-
sion. One thus learns the concept by forming 
hypotheses based on instances and then con-
firming or disconfirming those hypotheses 
against new examples. (Fodor’s worries about 
this notion of concept learning eventually led 
to his nativism; see below.) 
It is vital for the discussion to follow that, 
according to Fodor’s official view, both percep-
tion and motor control are just as computa-
tional as decision making and concept learning. 
Fodor’s view of perception, which he expounds 
further in the Modularity of mind,8 is that per-
ception is a dedicated device for taking trans-
duced signal and converting that signal into the 
kinds of contents that are more stereotypical of 
beliefs. As Fodor says,  
 
It is, I take it, an empirical question whether 
psychological processes are computational 
processes. But if they are, then what must go 
on in perception is that a description of the 
environment that is not couched in a vo-
cabulary whose terms designate values of 
physical variables is somehow computed on 
the basis of a description that is couched in 
such a vocabulary.9 
 
So, perception’s role is to take representa-
tions of the world that express only stimulus 
values – i.e., the physical quantities that 
transducers or purely “sensory” mechanisms 
are sensitive to – and convert them into the 
kinds of descriptions that can then be assent-
ed to in forming a belief.  This conversion is 
computational because it implements rules 
for going from one kind of description to the 
other. As Fodor expands the view later on,10 
perceptual inferences of this sort are distin-
guished from inferences more broadly by op-
erating on a restricted set of encapsulated in-
formation and assumptions, which it uses to 
abduct from physical descriptions to concep-
tual ones. But these processes are still compu-
tational nature.11 
A similar story goes for motor control. 
Motor control plays a very minor role in 
LOT, but Fodor addresses it explicitly in his 
paper, The appeal to tacit knowledge in psy-
chological explanation, where he constructs, 
with characteristic humor, the following ar-
chitectural view:   
 
There is a little man who lives in one’s 
head. The little man keeps a library. 
When one acts upon the intention to tie 
one’s shoes, the little man fetches down a 
volume entitled Tying One’s Shoes. The 
volume says such things as: “Take the left 
free end of the shoelace in the left hand. 
Cross the left free end of the shoelace 
over the right free end of the shoelace …, 
etc”. When the little man reads the in-
struction “take the left free end of the 
shoelace in the left hand”, he pushes a 
button on a control panel. The button is 
marked “take the left free end of a shoe-
lace in the left hand”. When depressed, it 
activates a series of wheels, cogs, levers, 
and hydraulic mechanisms. As a causal 
consequence of the functioning of these 
mechanisms, one’s left hand comes to 
seize the appropriate end of the shoelace. 
Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the rest 
of the instructions.12 
 
Fodor of course admits that this view is 
caricatured, but he thinks its general charac-
ter can very well be correct for all that. The 
question is only how to flesh out the empiri-
cal details. The important notion is that 
there is a hierarchy of computational pro-
cesses, which eventually bottom out in a non-
mental process of firing the muscles (i.e., a 
purely mechanistic process that is akin to the 
operation of wheels, levers, and hydraulics). 
Importantly, this kind of architecture gener-
alizes for Fodor. In general, one can expect 
that complex processes will involve a higher-
level “executive”: 
 
One imagines a hierarchy of “executive” 
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programs which function to analyze macro-
tasks into microtasks. Such programs may 
“call” both one another and lower-level 
problem-solving routines, though the extent 
of such cross-referencing is limited by the 
ingenuity of the program and, of course, the 
overall computational capacity of the ma-
chine. When things go well the results of 
lower-level processes can be integrated to 
yield a solution of whatever macroproblem 
the system was originally posed. Whether, 
in a given case, things do go well is partly 
determined by whether the executive pro-
grams manage to select the right subrou-
tines and to apply them in the right order.13 
 
So, to sum up: what it means for cognition 
to be “rational through and through” is that 
computationalism holds across the entire ar-
chitecture of the mind. In both perceptual and 
motor representation, the mental process goes 
all the way out, to the point where cognitive 
explanation stops and the mind interacts in a 
brute, non-mental causal fashion with the 
world – through perceptual transducers in the 
one case and through interaction with the 
body in the second case.  Importantly, as will 
be explored at length below, this means that 
the language of thought – again, qua syntacti-
cally structured mental state – is computa-
tionally sufficient to account, in principle, for 
any process in the mind. That is, it has an ex-
pressive power which can describe any way in 
which perception and motor systems interact 
with the world. 
 
█  2.3  The difference in kind commitment 
 
The first two commitments go very natu-
rally together. The last commitment, I hope, 
will strike you as not-so-obviously-in-
keeping with the others. (I hope that because 
that’s what the rest of the paper is about.) 
The final commitment is a firm distinction in 
kind between “discursive” representations, 
which are paradigmatic ones in the language 
of thought, and “non-discursive” ones, which 
more closely approximate pictures, and are 
more closely associated with perceptual expe-
rience and imagery. Fodor calls these “iconic” 
representations, which comprise visual imag-
es and are “very much like pictures”.14 While 
Fodor admits that, due to the broad-scope 
commitment, the representational architec-
ture he is working with is “conceivably 
monolithic”,15 he suggests that this is not in 
fact the case. Rather, empirical and intro-
spective evidence suggests that «imaging 
plays some interesting role in thought».16 
Fodor struggles to articulate that role, 
however, because images don’t have the right 
syntactic or semantic properties to contribute 
to a computationalist conception of thought – 
hence, «thinking and imaging can’t be the 
same thing».17 While images can refer by re-
semblance, they do not have the predicative 
structure that allows for semantic evaluation – 
they therefore can’t be truth-apt. Since, ac-
cording to Fodor, thoughts just are the kind of 
things that can be true or false, images cannot 
constitute thought. Fodor thinks that this 
kind of failure is sufficient to doom any kind 
of empiricism, a theme that he will reiterate 
frequently throughout his corpus. 
On the other side, Fodor thinks that it is 
precisely the lack of resemblance between 
discursive representations and their referents 
which enable them to state determinate, 
truth-apt contents. If thinking about John 
involves imaging John, how does one have 
the thought that “John is tall”? The image of 
John may show a tall man, but it will also re-
semble all kinds of other properties of John, 
for instance whether or not he is also heavy-
set, whether he is standing or lying down, etc. 
Hence, non-discursive, imagistic representa-
tion fails to instantiate the connected proper-
ties of syntactic structure, truth-aptness, and 
abstractness that define discursive represen-
tations. Fodor later notes in LOT2 that this 
same kind of problem disallows images from 
negating or quantifying. 
In keeping with the broad scope claim 
above, there is no kind of thought which oc-
curs solely in an imagistic medium. Fodor is 
«in fact, strongly inclined to doubt the very 
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intelligibility of the suggestion that there is a 
stage at which cognitive processes are carried 
out in a medium that is fundamentally non-
discursive».18 (Fodor is talking about devel-
opmental stages here, but his claim would 
apply equally to parts of cognitive architec-
ture.)  And indeed, Fodor says that any non-
discursive representation needs to be used 
“under a description”.19 But, again, that 
doesn’t mean that there is no imagistic repre-
sentation. Fodor cites psychological studies 
which he takes to suggest the presence of im-
agistic representation. For instance, when 
subjects are asked to trace an imagined figure 
and answer questions about it, there is an in-
terference effect when they must give their 
responses by pointing to visual targets, rather 
than verbally. And these effects are modality 
specific – they reverse when subjects are an-
swering questions about auditory presenta-
tions of words).20 These results suggest the 
existence of imagery and its functional use-
fulness. The question is how to characterize 
that functionality. 
In the next two sections, I explore and cri-
tique the two proposals that Fodor developed 
to characterize the functional role of imagis-
tic representation. 
 
█  3  The Specific-Contribution Proposal 
 
█  3.1  Exegesis 
 
The first functional construal suggests 
that non-discursive representations play a 
particularly important functional role for cer-
tain kinds of tasks precisely in virtue of their 
representational form. Fodor considers a va-
riety of examples and possible task-types that 
might benefit. For instance, he suggests that 
constructing an image might allow for percep-
tual matching. So, when an auditory descrip-
tion of a letter (e.g., “capital P”), must be 
matched to a subsequent stimulus, «it is ex-
tremely natural to assume that what happens 
during the […] interstimulus interval is that 
the subject constructs a letter image to fit the 
auditory description, and that it is that image 
which gets matched to the visual display».21 
This kind of use might be extended to com-
paratives generally. One might use imagistic 
representations the same way one might 
point to a picture of a man and say, “I’m 
looking for someone dressed like this” or 
“taller than this”.22 Imagistic representations 
thus might be more efficient for certain kinds 
of processes, for instance those requiring 
parallel rather than serial search.23 
Fodor does not offer a definitive charac-
terization of what exactly imagistic represen-
tations offer, to what kinds of tasks, or why. 
What is very clear in Fodor, however, and as 
should be clear from the commitments 
above, is that non-discursive representations 
being employed to perform certain tasks is due 
to a computational process. Recall the hierar-
chy of executives from the previous section. 
Fodor suggests that it is “intelligent man-
agement”24 that organizes sub-processes in a 
goal directed way. As he states: 
 
There would seem to be a variety of repre-
sentations that a given input may receive, 
and which representation it does receive 
depends, inter alia, on the demands of the 
subject’s task. Second, the subject’s 
achievement in matching the exploitation 
of his representational capacities to the ex-
igencies of the [task] situation is itself a 
form of intelligent behavior.25 
 
Of course, via the broad scope commit-
ment, these executive processes are them-
selves discursive and computational. Put all 
this together, and you get a view on which 
executive processes, which are computation-
al, construct visual images in order to perform 
certain tasks. And indeed this is what Fodor 
proposes: 
 
The explanation thus implies (what 
common sense also suggests) that we have 
psychological faculties which can con-
struct images which display the infor-
mation that corresponding descriptions 
convey discursively; i.e., faculties which 
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permit us to construct images from de-
scriptions. The experiment demonstrates 
that having the information displayed as 
an image facilitates performance in cer-
tain kinds of tasks.26 
 
Moreover, the images themselves, per the 
previous section, are not capable of much. It 
is only the images along with the symbols 
that interpret them. This falls out of the 
computational commitment – images, recall, 
do not have a determinate content, which 
thought requires. So images can only con-
tribute to thought if they can be interpreted 
according to discursive symbols, i.e., “under a 
description”. 
The important upshot is as follows: for 
whatever role the images are supposed to 
play, discursive representations must be ex-
pressively adequate to describe the relevant 
contents in those representations. This is 
true both of the generation and use of the 
image. Since computational processes are 
generating the images to meet certain task 
goals, they must be capable of describing ex-
actly the needed properties of the image. 
And, since only discursive representations 
can specify the contents of the images in a 
way that they can be used for other processes 
(which, via the broad scope commitment, are 
computational), any content that can be of 
use in the image must be expressible by the 
discursive representations that describe 
them.  These combined commitments, as I 
argue in the next section, create a deep prob-
lem in finding a functionally distinctive con-
tribution for imagistic representations. 
 
█  3.2 Assessing the specific-contribution pro-
posal 
 
The problem I have been exegetically 
working towards is this: if the entire func-
tionally relevant content of the image can be 
specified by the discursive system construct-
ing the image, and if that same content is 
what is read off by the discursive system that 
uses the image, then the content of the image 
is functionally redundant. The image plays no 
role that couldn’t be played by directly feed-
ing the descriptive content into the inter-
preter. So, on the kind of hierarchically struc-
tured executive system Fodor posits, along 
with the broad scope commitment, there 
can’t be a functionally distinct role for imag-
istic representation. They are, and must be, 
computationally inert. 
To flesh out this problem, we can allude 
to a famous discussion from cognitive sci-
ence: Larkin and Simon’s wonderful paper, 
Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thou-
sand words.27 Larkin and Simon primarily fo-
cus on reasoning with external representa-
tions – diagrams on physical paper that are 
viewed with the visual system – but they 
clearly think that something similar goes on 
in the mind when people construct and use 
visual images. Their discussion is particularly 
relevant for two reasons: they assume that 
images and sentential representations can be 
informationally equivalent, which is a corol-
lary of Fodor’s “expressive adequacy” com-
mitment; and they assume that the function-
al advantage for reasoning with an image are 
primarily in terms of efficiency, which, as we 
 
Figure 1.  A pulley problem; from J.H. LARKIN, H. 
SIMON, Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten 
thousand words, cit., p. 73. 
  Burnston 
 
78 
saw above, is one way that Fodor describes 
the possible advantage. 
Larkin and Simon consider the pulley 
problem given above, where the goal is to 
figure out the ratio of the two weights W1 
and W2. They assume that this requires a 
way of representing the data, a program to 
reason about the data, and a database of in-
formation about the domain. They suggest 
that, even if performing the same set of in-
ferences based on the same database, dia-
grammatic and sentential representations 
will differ in how they structure the data and 
in the kinds of steps their programs perform. 
Larkin and Simon consider both types of 
architecture. On their framework, the two 
share the same database of knowledge, which 
explicitly states the relation between tensions 
of strings and weights, between single and 
multiple supports on a weight, and between 
pulleys and each of these properties. For in-
stance, each starts from the assumption that 
the weight of W1 is one, and that weights 
and tensions are proportional. Therefore, the 
tension on string p is also one. From these 
assumptions, along with assumptions of how 
tensions distribute over and under pulleys, 
and how weight is determined with multiple 
strings of support (it is the sum the two ten-
sions), one can work out that the ratio is 5:1. 
I am not going to go through the details for 
reasons of space; interested readers should 
consult the original paper. The important 
point is that the differences in data structure 
and program equate to a difference in pro-
cessing efficiency. The data structure for the 
sentential program is simply a list of all of the 
relevant facts about the ropes, the pulleys 
and their arrangements. The data structure 
for the diagrammatic program, however, in-
dexes the information to locations. 
Both programs start at W1 with its weight 
of one, and the associated tension of one on 
rope p. And each proceeds step-by-step, de-
termining the tensions and weights as they go 
according to the rules. The difference is that 
the diagram program has a basic and, Larkin 
and Simon assume, computationally cheap 
                   
Figure 2.  Search processes in sentential versus diagrammatic programs; from J.H. LARKIN, H. SIMON, Why a dia-
gram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words, cit., pp. 77-79. 
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shift of attention operation. They also assume 
that all of the information at a location is 
immediately available to the diagram pro-
gram. This leads to a massive change in the 
search costs for the two programs. Since the 
sentential program has no privileged location 
for search, it must search through every bit of 
information for what is relevant to each pro-
cessing step, and that includes the new in-
formation it infers at each step. This is 
shown in the table on the left of Figure 2, 
where each “o” represents non-needed in-
formation, and each “x” needed information, 
at each processing step P1-P6. 
The diagram program, however, only has 
to move its attention as it computes each 
step, and all of the needed information is 
immediately available. This search pattern is 
shown on the right of Figure 2 (the number 
on the left at each node is the step at which 
that node’s value is calculated; the number 
on the right is the value obtained). 
So far, there is nothing out-of-keeping 
with broad-scope computationalism. The 
differences in efficiency are determined only 
by differences in the number of sentential 
representations that must be held in mind 
and searched through. The diagram provides 
a distinctive input to the program, and the 
program can employ basic operations (e.g., 
shift-in-attention) to realize the gain in effi-
ciency. And the gain is significant – from 138 
search steps down to seven. 
The problem arises when we think about 
the nature of executive control for Fodor, 
and the fact that imagery cannot operate 
strictly on perceptual input. Problem solving, 
recall, is hierarchical for Fodor, with com-
mands passing between levels of executive 
control. Higher-level control processes or-
ganize types of representations in the best 
way to solve given tasks, and these represen-
tations include images. Imagery is the result 
of a process that generates the image from a 
description – in imagery, as opposed to in 
perception, the content that is imaged must 
be generated internally by the system. In this 
scenario, I submit, there is no way for the im-
age to play a non-redundant role in the prob-
lem-solving process. 
In going through this, it will be helpful to 
have an idealized architecture in mind. Call 
the higher-level executive just “EXECUTIVE” 
for short. Call the image-generator the 
“DRAWER” program. And call the program 
that reasons about the problem the “SOLV-
ER”. By the broad-scope commitment, and its 
corollary that the discursive system is expres-
sively adequate for describing anything con-
tained in the image, we can have two versions 
of SOLVER, which correspond to the two pro-
grams given in Larkin and Simon. Given the 
informational equivalence assumed by both 
the broad-scope commitment, and by Larkin 
and Simon, we must assume that the overall 
system has the resources to solve the problem 
either by generating an image or via the pure-
ly sentential method. Let’s call the purely sen-
tential program SOLVER(SEN) and the dia-
grammatic one SOLVER(IMG). In this setup, 
we can see that there are a variety of reasons 
why the image can play no functional role. 
Consider what EXECUTIVE has to do. EX-
ECUTIVE has to look at the problem and de-
termine the best way to solve it – i.e., it has to 
determine which representations and pro-
grams are the best ones for the job. The pri-
mary computational advantage attributed to 
the image is one of efficiency. Executive doing 
its job would consist in its recognizing that, for 
this kind of problem, the kind of program run 
with a diagram by SOLVER(IMG) is more effi-
cient than the kind of program run by SOLV-
ER(SEN). Given this determination, EXECU-
TIVE instructs DRAWER to generate the image 
and runs SOLVER(IMG) on that input. 
This sounds nice enough, until we realize 
that this purported gain in efficiency does 
not require any image at all. In order to make 
the determination, EXECUTIVE has to know 
exactly how many steps are involved in the 
search process, and have a rubric for prefer-
ring one over the other. But, as Fodor notes 
in LOT, the only way to measure complexity 
in a computational system is through syntax 
– the complexity of the representations and 
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operations that the program will have to use 
to solve the problem.  In order for EXECU-
TIVE to be able to make this kind of account-
ing, it must know what the data structures 
are and how many steps will be needed by 
each program. But, according to broad-
scope, the executive system is a sentential sys-
tem. EXECUTIVE itself cannot recognize non-
discursive representation. So in order for it to 
judge efficiency, it would have to already 
know all of the steps that would be per-
formed over what data structures, and would 
have to know this in discursive format. Now 
we can phrase the functional redundancy 
worry.  What is the point of actually running 
DRAWER, given that it already has exactly the 
information that SOLVER(IMG) needs to rep-
resent discursively, in exactly that format? 
Recall that, in order to be used, the image 
must be converted into discursive represen-
tation, but given that the information is al-
ready available in that form to EXECUTIVE, 
there is no point to running DRAWER rather 
than directly feeding the information, in dis-
cursive form, to SOLVER(IMG). 
One natural response to this worry, which 
is unfortunately not available to Fodor, is to 
deny that EXECUTIVE has to have access to 
everything that SOLVER(SEN) and SOLV-
ER(IMG) do in order to make its determina-
tion. Rather, it might operate on a kind of 
heuristic – e.g., “when solving pulley prob-
lems use SOLVER(IMG)”. On this scheme, all 
EXECUTIVE would require, on the front-end, 
is an ability to recognize task-types. It 
wouldn’t need to count representations and 
operations, and hence wouldn’t need to have 
access to them in discursive format. It could 
simply call the right program for the task. 
Now, the heuristic solution is not open to 
Fodor because he thinks that central cogni-
tion is isotropic.28 What it is for a process to 
be isotropic, vis-à-vis some domain, is to be 
open to information from anywhere in the 
system in solving problems in that domain. 
That is, there is no demarcation of the do-
main “pulley problems” that determines ex-
actly the right set of information or program 
that should be used to solve that problem. 
Fodor argues very strenuously in The mind 
doesn’t work that way29 that the isotropic na-
ture of central cognition (for our purposes, 
EXECUTIVE) prevents the use of heuristics to 
solve the frame problem (i.e., determining 
which process, over which information, 
should be used to solve a given task). 
I don’t want to focus on this aspect of 
Fodor’s work here, since I think that, even giv-
en the possibility of a heuristic program-
selector, no non-redundant role for imagery is 
guaranteed. To see this, now consider what 
DRAWER has to do. DRAWER’s function, recall, 
is to generate images from descriptions. On the 
non-heuristic account, presumably the descrip-
tion comes from the executive. On the heuristic 
account, however, the executive does not have 
access to the information that DRAWER uses to 
generate the image. Let’s assume that DRAWER, 
itself, can generate the description it needs in 
order to produce the image. So, when being 
called for pulley-problem, it produces an image 
of a pulley system under the description given 
by the empirical data. 
Here’s the issue: DRAWER can’t produce 
just any diagram in relation to the description. 
The diagram has to be the kind of one that 
SOLVER(IMG) can use to solve the problem. 
How are we to guarantee this? The only way 
to do so is if DRAWER either represents, or is 
wired such as to only produce, exactly the 
kinds of images that SOLVER(IMG) can read. 
But, again, the image is generated from a de-
scription, and therefore these properties must 
be represented discursively in DRAWER, or 
DRAWER must be somehow hard-wired to only 
produce just the discursive representations 
(since these generate the images) that SOLV-
ER(IMG) reads. For instance, in the diagram-
matic solution from Larkin and Simon, there 
is a basic operation of attention moving be-
tween locations. And given that DRAWER has 
to produce images in the relevant diagram-
matic space, it must be able to represent loca-
tions in sentential format. Since location is just 
an index for information which allows for or-
dered search, and since that information must 
Fodor on imagistic mental representations 
 
81 
be represented discursively on both the front 
and back end, DRAWER already can express all 
of the information that SOLVER(IMG) uses dis-
cursively in discursive format. Similarly for the 
other properties that DRAWER supposedly de-
picts in the diagrammatic space. 
But if DRAWER can already represent all of 
the properties that SOLVER(IMG) uses to solve 
the problem in discursive format, then there 
is no point to generating the image. After all 
SOLVER(IMG) is itself a computational pro-
cess, one that has to operate over sentential 
representation. The only difference is that 
the diagram makes certain inputs “immedi-
ately available” to it. What informational 
equivalence, plus the image-from-description 
nature of DRAWER entails, however, is that all 
of the relevant information needed by the 
consumer process (SOLVER(IMG)) is repre-
sented in discursive format by the front-end 
one (DRAWER). If this is the case, then no 
computational advantage is gained by having 
the image. DRAWER might as well skip draw-
ing and feed the sentential representations 
directly as input to SOLVER(IMG). 
We can briefly consider some potential 
responses. One is to question informational 
equivalence. On this response, there is more 
to the image than what is contained in the 
description that is used to generate the im-
age. Perhaps there is information that is im-
plicit in the description that the full image 
conveys explicitly, and perhaps this is what a 
program like SOLVER(IMG) uses to run its 
program. The problem with this proposal is 
that it is left mysterious why the particular 
information that is implicit in the descrip-
tion, but explicit in the diagram, should be of 
any functional use. As Fodor stresses over 
and over about icons, their content is inde-
terminate if not used under a description.  It is 
only discursive description of their properties 
that makes icons usable for reasoning. What 
DRAWER has to do, in order to make some-
thing that SOLVER(IMG) can use, is to make 
an image that will precisely match the de-
scription under which SOLVER(IMG) uses the 
image. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that 
the implicit information will in fact be useful.  
Fodor in fact admits this, saying that, «The 
image that gets produced may be quite 
schematic since how the image is taken – 
what role it plays in cognitive processing – is 
determined not only by its figural properties 
but also by the character of the description it 
is paired with».30 
Two quick other responses are worth con-
sidering. First it might be argued that the dia-
grammatic representation serves a memory 
function; it might be easier to remember in-
formation in a diagrammatic format. Second, 
it could be argued that the image plays a com-
municative role that is not playable by discur-
sive representations. Perhaps, for instance, 
SOLVER(IMG) can only take images as inputs, 
and cannot receive direct sentential input 
from either EXECUTIVE or DRAWER. As such, 
an imagistic intermediary between EXECUTIVE 
(or DRAWER, on the heuristic solution) is re-
quired to generate the benefits of efficiency. 
The thing to note about these proposals is 
that each relies, not on a general view about 
the architecture of cognition, but on quasi-
empirical claims about what the memory lim-
its of architectures for particular data struc-
tures might be, or on what kinds of programs 
can share what information. It is hard to 
know how to even assess this kind of claim 
without discussion of particular systems, and 
it is thus out-of-keeping with Fodor’s general 
kind of argument – namely, that the project 
of naturalizing the mind, along with the na-
ture of computation, require that cognition 
operate in a way that meets the broad-scope 
commitment. The broad-scope and distinct 
kind commitments are, thus, incompatible 
with images serving any non-redundant 
functional role in thought. 
As noted, Fodor almost completely aban-
dons the specific-contribution view after 
LOT. I can only find one place in LOT2 
where he references this possibility.31 I sug-
gest that this was for good reason – it is not 
really compatible with broad-scope computa-
tionalism. In the next section, we will consid-
er the possibility that he pursues further. 
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First, however, I want to point out that the 
specific-contribution view is still relevant to 
current discussions. 
 
█  3.3  Relevance to current discussions 
 
To be perfectly clear: I am not attempting 
anything close to exegetical thoroughness 
here (or in section 4.3 below). The point in 
this section is just that the considerations 
raised by close analysis of Fodor’s proposals 
are not restricted to Fodor’s view. 
Consider, first, Carruthers’ recent ac-
count of cognitive architecture in his book, 
The centered mind. Carruthers’ considera-
tions, at first, seem very far removed from 
Fodor’s. He is interested primarily in what 
the science of working memory can tell us 
about the stream of consciousness, and 
Fodor is persistently quiet on the nature of 
consciousness. However, the architecture 
Carruthers proposes is Fodorian in many re-
spects. While Carruthers thinks that all con-
scious experience is sensory in character, he 
posits that the activation and control of these 
sensory images is due to amodal representa-
tions, which are «active in the background of 
the stream of consciousness, causing and 
controlling the latter’s contents».32 Moreo-
ver, they “determine” those contents.33 Once 
sensory representations are thus activated, 
they are selected for global broadcast, hence 
becoming conscious. However, the users of 
these representations elsewhere in the mind 
are also amodal, and amodal contents can be 
“bound into” sensory representations and 
broadcast along with them. Lastly, Car-
ruthers’ pictures of decision and categoriza-
tion are similar to Fodor’s, in that each are 
computational processes involving amodal 
concepts. So, actions are the direct result of 
an entirely amodal decision process, and see-
ing an image of a Dalmatian in a page of 
blotches involves applying the concept 
“Dalmatian” to one’s percept. 
Again, this is not even a half-hearted at-
tempt at a full exegesis.  But I want to show 
how someone could be motivated by the pre-
sent concerns to pose questions to an account 
like Carruthers’. For one, it is not clear that 
the notion of an amodal concept being 
“bound into” a sensory one is compatible 
with the distinct-kinds commitment, because 
the nature of this binding is obscure. It 
makes sense for how an amodal concept can 
fit into a sentential structure – i.e., by playing 
a syntactic role within it. But what “slot” in 
an iconic representation does an amodal con-
cept fill, and how does it get there?34 Second-
ly, the worry about functional redundancy is 
particularly pertinent here. Carruthers sug-
gests that images play a particularly useful 
role in prospective decision-making, for en-
visioning the possible consequences of one’s 
actions. But if these contents are determined 
by amodal representations, and must be con-
ceptualized as such, then the functional re-
dundancy worry looms. 
Now, there are other aspects of Car-
ruthers’ account which he could draw on, 
which are not available to Fodor. For in-
stance, he thinks that the modal-amodal in-
teractions in the mind are a result of evolu-
tionary conservation of elements of cognitive 
architecture. This is the kind of empirical 
claim that I suggested above might be needed 
to get out of the redundancy issue.  However, it 
is famously not open to Fodor due to his skep-
ticism regarding evolutionary theorizing about 
the mind,35 and I too am skeptical that evolu-
tionary considerations can confirm hypotheses 
about cognitive architecture.36 But this is where 
the conversation would have to go. 
As another example, consider current 
empirically informed philosophy of action.  
Recently, several theorists have begun to rec-
ognize the importance of motor imagery in 
action, and this has led to the question of 
how these kinds of representations interact 
with traditionally defined, discursive propo-
sitional attitudes. There is no consensus on 
how to solve this “interface problem”.37 My 
own diagnosis of the state of this discussion 
is that it is in somewhat of a quandary, with 
philosophers attributing all of the genuine 
decision processes to propositional attitudes, 
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and then trying to figure out how those deci-
sions get embedded into perceptual and mo-
tor representations.38 But I think this is sus-
ceptible to redundancy worries. 
To bring this out, consider a kind of case 
inspired by the discussion in Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia.39 Imagine a mountain climber who 
begins to fall, and can grab either at a sturdy 
ledge or a bit of loose gravel. Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia suggest both that motor imagery is 
able to select the ledge as the goal for a grasp-
ing action, and that this process has to be co-
ordinated with a purely discursive process 
which is also capable of representing that 
goal. As they put it, the outcome is “multiply 
determined”. It seems to me, at least, that I 
would rather not have to coordinate multiple 
cognitive faculties in a sophisticated way if 
(i) that coordination were redundant, and (ii) 
I’m at risk of falling off a mountain. Of 
course, this is an intuition pump and not an 
argument, but the functional redundancy 
worry informs it.40 I’ll say more about this in 
the final section.  For now, just note that this 
is not a problem if you posit that no genuine-
ly mental stuff is done by motor imagery – if, 
following Fodor, you posit that propositional 
representation goes all the way out the edges 
of the motor system.41 
 
█  4 Images as a reference-fixing medium 
 
█  4.1 Exegesis 
 
The second kind of function is explored 
peremptorily in LOT, but comes to be the 
major view Fodor puts forward in LOT2, and 
its influential companion paper The revenge 
of the given.42 Put briefly, the view is that non-
discursive representations are useful as a way 
of fixing the reference of concepts. The idea is 
that non-conceptual representations serve as 
a kind of medium in which the fixing of con-
ceptual reference can occur. This process is 
not computational, but serves as a starting 
point for computational thought. This view 
is bound up in complicated ways with 
Fodor’s nativism and conceptual atomism, 
and it is worth exploring these ways briefly. 
In LOT, the idea that the language of 
thought is innate is primarily motivated by 
considerations about learning natural lan-
guage, and learning concepts on the basis of 
perception. For Fodor, learning a concept 
(/word) involves learning a rule under which 
it applies. Learning a rule is a process of hy-
pothesis and confirmation. But this is prob-
lematic: in order to formulate the hypothesis 
about the concept, one must be able to repre-
sent both the concept and the rule which is 
supposed to determine its extension. Hence, 
concepts have to be innate. 
In LOT, Fodor was concerned with “ame-
liorating” the counter-intuitiveness of nativ-
ism, and attempted to do so in two ways. 
First, he wanted to show that you could make 
sense of how innate concepts are initially ac-
tivated in response to the environment (so 
that they needn’t be “literally present” at 
birth), and second he wanted to suggest that 
maybe not all concepts needed to be innate. 
He pursued the first point with the notion of 
an “exemplar,” and the second with a distinc-
tion between simple and complex concepts. 
Exemplars are supposed to be perceptual and 
themselves non-conceptual, and thus don’t 
have to be learned. The idea is that when one 
is in the presence of a certain kind of envi-
ronmental input, one’s innate concept is acti-
vated, and this process is itself a non-
inferential one. Since it is not inferential, it is 
not learned (learning, recall, is one of the 
mental processes covered by the broad-scope 
commitment). Fodor reaches for the notion of 
“imprinting” as an analogous process, and he 
repeats this in LOT2. In LOT, the notion is 
that you have some innate, simple concepts 
that are triggered by exemplars, and then you 
can generate new concepts via conceptual 
combination. So, maybe you get “flying” and 
“machine” by imprinting, and then you can get 
“airplane” by defining it as “flying machine”. 
The notion of imprinting, while serving 
an ameliorative role in LOT, became intense-
ly important for Fodor as his nativism be-
came more pronounced. And his nativism 
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became more pronounced as his atomism be-
came more pronounced. Fodor subsequently 
developed doubt about there being any defini-
tions for concepts, and hence about the notion 
that you can have a robust simple/complex dis-
tinction for concepts. The worry is that any 
definitional notion of concepts implies a disas-
trous semantic holism.43 I don’t have space to 
go into these developments in detail, and doing 
so would take us relatively far afield. The point 
is that, once you take concepts to be atomistic 
and unlearned, the problem of how they con-
nect to the environment is exacerbated. Fodor 
spends a fair bit of time dealing with this prob-
lem in LOT2, and his notion of non-conceptual 
representation was largely shaped by it. 
In LOT2, Fodor, befitting his now rabid 
“mad dog” nativism, suggests that the very 
idea of learning a concept – any concept, 
now – is incoherent. But concepts still must 
be connected to the world.44 Here is where 
imprinting comes to the fore: 
 
There would appear to be plenty of etho-
logical precedents – from “imprinting” to 
“parameter setting” inclusive – where it’s 
implausible that the acquisition of a con-
cept is mediated by a rational process like 
inductive inference, but where concept 
acquisition is nevertheless highly sensitive 
to the character of the creature’s experi-
ence. So, neither the LOT1 argument nor 
the present revision shows that concepts 
can’t be acquired from experience. The 
most they show is that acquiring a con-
cept from experience must be distin-
guished from learning it.45 
 
The way this works, according to LOT2, 
is that we have a non-inferential ability to 
recognize stereotypical referents, and once 
we do this it triggers (via a non-mental, neu-
ral process) the activation of the concept. 
Here is where non-conceptual representation 
fits in. The stereotypes, since they are meta-
physically distinct and ontogenetically prior 
to concept activation, cannot themselves be 
concepts. Hence, there must be a non-
discursive medium in which they are repre-
sented. And, since iconic representations are 
already part of Fodor’s mental ontology, they 
naturally slide in here. The considered view in 
LOT2 is that we have an “attractor landscape” 
of recognitional abilities, defined non-
conceptually, that each attractor corresponds 
to a stereotype, and that falling into the attrac-
tor triggers the concept. This is, in effect, a 
dispositional rather than an inferential account 
of concept formation, where «what’s innate is 
the geometry of the attractor landscape».46 
Fodor is never very clear what this kind of 
geometry consists in, only suggesting that it 
allows us to pick up on “statistical” regulari-
ties in the environment. The idea that the 
geometry is predominantly innate thus min-
imizes the role of learning in imprinting on 
objects. Fodor will occasionally refer to the 
kind of fixing on exemplars he discusses as 
“statistical-inductive,” where this is only 
characterized negatively – i.e., as not the kind 
of hypothesis formation and confirmation 
that he thinks must characterize concept 
learning. In both LOT and LOT2 Fodor ges-
tures towards a kind of learning that might 
take place within the perceptual system itself, 
but he clearly thinks this is limited, and 
bound to particulars (i.e., not concepts). He 
suggests in LOT that perceptual learning can 
allow us to discriminate more finely between 
objects, and that it can allows us to recognize 
certain sensory properties associated with 
objects – e.g., «what a steak tastes like, learn-
ing what middle C sounds like played on an 
oboe, and so forth».47 In LOT2, Fodor says 
that all his nativism requires is that the “ini-
tial layout” of the attractor landscape is set, 
where is possible that the geometry «can al-
ter under the pressure of experience, learn-
ing, maturation, or any other mind-world or 
mind-body interactions».48 
What Fodor is clear about, however, is 
that there are limits to what non-conceptual 
representations can represent. While they 
might trigger the application of a concept, 
non-conceptual representations themselves 
cannot individuate an object as falling under 
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a category.  That is to say, while imprinting is 
itself a process of going from non-conceptual 
contents to the tokening of concepts, non-
conceptual representations don’t themselves 
convey the content of the concept. Fodor is 
thus committed to a “shallow,” “thin,” or 
“conservative” view of what non-conceptual 
contents can represent. As he says:   
 
In the case of vision, the icons register the 
sorts of properties that photographs do 
(two-dimensional shape, shading, color, and 
so forth) but not “object” properties like be-
ing an animal or, a fortiori, being a cat be-
longing to Granny. You can, of course, see a 
cat as a cat that belongs to Granny; but that 
requires conceptualization. The present 
point is that a cat can’t be, as it were, given 
as a cat that belongs to Granny.49   
 
So, for Fodor non-conceptual representa-
tions are bound to the particulars that the 
visual system has access to. They are the out-
comes of the mechanisms of transduction. 
While these may be stored in a “buffer” so 
that imprinting can work over them, they 
themselves do not contain any content aside 
from the physical properties that can be 
transduced. 
Fodor’s positive view of iconic representa-
tion is the “picture principle,” according to 
which every decomposition of an iconic repre-
sentation represents a part of what the icon 
represents. So, if you carve a bit out of a pic-
ture of a dog, then that bit still represents (say) 
the leg of the dog, whereas if you pull out the 
“o” from “dog”, it doesn’t represent some part 
of the dog. This principle captures the general 
properties we’ve been discussing – the lack of 
determinate content, the lack of predicative 
structure, etc., because there is no “privileged” 
semantic decomposition of an icon, the way 
there is for discursive representations. 
Two last exegetical points are worth not-
ing before we move on to consider this func-
tion for non-discursive representation. The 
first is to note how fundamentally different 
this proposed function is, compared to the 
one in the last section, even though they are 
not clearly distinguished in LOT. The specif-
ic-contribution view suggests that non-
discursive representations play a functionally 
distinct role for contributing to specific tasks 
involving deliberation and judgment. The 
concept-trigger view restricts non-conceptual 
representation to the very borders of the 
mind, in fact yet another significant step (the 
statistical-inductive one) from where con-
cepts are applied. Nothing task-specific or de-
liberative is done in this medium. So, the sec-
ond point to note is really just how much bet-
ter this fits with the other commitments. I 
now move on to assess this position. 
 
█  4.2 Assessing the reference-fixing view 
 
The basic commitments of the reference-
fixing view of non-conceptual representa-
tions are that (i) they are pre-computational, 
and (ii) they are “shallow” in what they can 
represent. They are, in effect, just the outputs 
of perceptual transducers, and a process of 
statistical-inductive learning allows for the 
“imprinting” of concepts onto particular pat-
terns in these representations. All the work of 
forming perceptual judgments, updating be-
liefs, and thinking is still purely done in dis-
cursive format. 
The basic problem with this picture is 
that Fodor underestimates the scope, the 
malleability, and the impact on behavior of 
processes that are non-conceptual and in-
volve statistical-inductive learning. In this 
section I’ll discuss empirical results from per-
ceptual learning which suggest that, far from 
simply giving way to discursive representa-
tions, perceptual learning encodes non-
conceptual structures that are actively em-
ployed in judgments. What marks these rep-
resentations as non-discursive is that they are 
holistic and dimensional. 
I’ll discuss two examples, which bring out 
the holistic and dimensional nature of per-
ceptual learning. The first is from a highly-
cited paper by Schyns and Rodet,50 who ex-
plicitly contrasted holistic models of percep-
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tual recognition with models based on logical 
construction. The way they did this was to 
have subjects categorize items that, in terms 
of conjunctions of features, were equivalent, 
but vary the subjects’ history of exposure to 
these combinations of features. Their basic 
stimuli and methods are shown below. 
In the left panel are the training regimes 
and the basic features. The bottom shows the 
two basic features (X in the middle, Y to the 
right), and their conjunction (XY, to the left). 
The experimental groups were distinguished 
by their training regimes. One group fol-
lowed the regime in the middle row, first 
learning to distinguish feature X, then learn-
ing to distinguish XY.  The other group was 
first taught XY, then X (top row). Schyns and 
Rodet suggested that the group first trained 
on X would subsequently be able to recognize 
Y. That’s because, when they have to learn 
XY, they have to add something (i.e., Y) spe-
cific to the feature X, with they’ve already 
learned. However, they suggested that the 
group who first learned XY would not subse-
quently recognize Y after learning X, because 
they encoded XY as a holistic unit. 
They tested this via the experiment laid 
out in the right panel. The two parts of each 
row were presented to subjects successively, 
and subjects were told that they were two dis-
tinct parts of the same “cell,” presented sepa-
rately. The top row shows X paired with a 
distractor feature, the middle row shows XY 
paired with a distractor feature, and the bot-
tom row shows the two parts of XY present-
ed sequentially, which the experimenters re-
ferred to as X-Y. Subjects were asked what 
categories were presented in the combined 
snapshots. Both groups referred to the top 
row stimuli as X, and to the middle row 
stimuli as XY. However, they differed in the 
X-Y stimuli. While almost all of the group 
first trained with XY classified the bottom 
row as X, a significantly greater number of 
the group first trained on X classified the 
bottom row as XY. 
What explains this difference? Schyns and 
Rodet suggest that the training history pre-
disposed the XY→X group to encode XY ho-
listically – that is, not as comprised of parts – 
whereas it predisposed the X→XY group to 
also distinguish Y. Thus, subjects in the 
X→XY group would be predisposed to see 
XY as a conjunction, and thus classify the X-
Y stimuli as XY, whereas the XY→X subjects 
would perceive XY holistically, and thus clas-
sify X-Y only by the X feature.  Amazingly, 
this effect persists even if XY→X subjects 
were also subsequently taught Y. It seems 
like, once XY was encoded holistically, it was 
just not subject to decomposition. To test 
whether this was just some weighting opera-
tion on distinguished feature, subjects were 
then shown example cells and simply asked 
to draw the features they’d seen before. 
When X→XY subjects saw a cell with a Y fea-
ture, such as in the second row of the right 
panel of figure XX, they drew a circle around 
the Y feature, but subjects from the XY→X 
group did not. It was as though they were 
“cognitively blind” to Y. 
Why is all this important? What the ex-
periment shows is that perceptual learning 
distinguishes categories that are equivalent in 
terms of their discursive descriptions. In both 
groups, XY can simply be defined as the con-
junction X˄Y. But if both groups of subjects 
in fact represented them that way, they 
would both classify the X-Y stimuli as XY. 
But they don’t do that, and hence the discur-
 
Figure 3.  Stimuli and test conditions in P.G. SHYNS, 
L. RODET, Categorization creates functional features, 
cit., pp. 687-688. 
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sive representation does not describe sub-
jects’ categories (at least for the XY→X 
group). This suggests that perceptual learn-
ing creates structured representations whose 
content is distinct from discursive descrip-
tions – i.e., non-conceptual – and that those 
representations shape perceptual judgments. 
But, on the reference-fixing view, this is more 
function than non-conceptual representation 
should contribute. Equivalence of discursive 
representation should equate to equivalence 
of judgment. 
I’ll return to this shortly. First, I want to 
discuss one more example which shows that 
percepts are organized dimensionally. Con-
sider the following figure from Gureckis and 
Goldstone.51 
The figure shows an exemplar space of 
faces. Each square represents an individual 
face. Each face is constructed by combining, 
in a continuous fashion, the features on ei-
ther end of dimension A, with those on either 
end of dimension B. In a wide range of stud-
ies using faces, as well as objects like cars,52 it 
has been shown that experimenters can de-
fine an arbitrary category boundary in this 
space (such as the vertical line in the center 
of the space above), and subjects can learn to 
discriminate the arbitrary categories based 
on generalization from exemplars. Subjects are 
presented an example, guess which category 
it belongs to, and are given feedback. After 
training, subjects can categorize a novel ex-
ample as belonging to the appropriate cate-
gory. Moreover, if subjects are trained on the 
A versus B discrimination, they also, with no 
feedback at all, begin to distinguish along the 
orthogonal dimension as well (thus splitting 
the space into four quadrants as shown). 
This kind of representational space is 
called a morphspace53 because not only do 
subjects discriminate along the relevant di-
mensions, but the dimensions are actually 
warped to accentuate differences between 
categories. This is shown by tracking sub-
jects’ similarity judgments before and after 
the training. A number of different types of 
similarity judgment have been used,54 but 
their general result is that intra-category 
members are classified as more alike after 
training than before training. 
This causes problems for Fodor’s view be-
cause it is arguable that these representations 
are non-discursive, but they underlie percep-
tual category judgments. This is out-of-
bounds for the reference-fixing view. Fodor 
calls it a truism that recognition requires dis-
cursive representation.  As he says elsewhere:  
«If the contents of perceptual judgments 
weren’t conceptualized, they wouldn’t be 
judgments. A judgment that a is F ipso facto 
conceptualizes a as F».55 These dimensional 
representations are non-discursive in virtue 
of their continuity, and in this sense they 
meet the picture principle – every part of the 
dimension represents a part of the 
morphspace. They also exhibit the lack of de-
terminate content that Fodor takes to be 
characteristic of images. 
However, it is pretty clear that these repre-
sentations do not have many of the other prop-
erties of pictures. They do not represent physi-
cal space, for one thing. For another, they are 
not exhausted by particulars in the way that 
Fodor’s view suggests. That is, they represent 
 
Figure 4.  Exemplar space from T.M. GURECKIS, R.L. 
GOLDSTONE, The effect of the internal structure of 
categories on perception, cit. 
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patterns of variation amongst particulars, rather 
than the particulars themselves. Lastly, it 
should be noted that representations of the 
kind discussed in this section are taken to be 
widely important – they have been taken to 
underlie expertise in X-ray reading56 and facial 
recognition,57 among other things. 
To summarize: non-conceptual represen-
tation, under the concept-trigger view, is 
pushed out to the very edges of the mind, 
such that the kind of inductive process that 
triggers concepts doesn’t really challenge the 
broad scope commitment. Non-conceptual 
representation is a just a buffer where the 
linkage between sensory input and conceptu-
alization occurs. The rest of the picture can 
remain just as before. If non-discursive rep-
resentations are used in any type of active 
judgment, then this questions the move to 
quarantine imagistic representations to the 
very boundaries of the mind. As I will suggest 
in section 5, this opens up a whole range of 
options for the possible functionality of these 
representations. 
 
█  4.3 Relevance to current debates 
 
The picture principle, and the issues that 
surround it, have become central for a variety 
of issues in the philosophy of perception. The 
two most pertinent also happen to be inti-
mately related – one is the perception-cognition 
distinction and the other about higher-level 
content. Both aspects of Fodor’s view have 
been influential, including his definition of 
format and his notion of shallow contents. 
As with the case of motor imagery discussed 
in section 3.3, in has struck some theorists that 
the best way of drawing a distinction between 
perception and cognition is in terms of repre-
sentational format,58 and Fodor’s characteriza-
tion has proven foundational for this debate.59 
The form distinction is one candidate out of an 
array for characterizing perception, but it has 
some significant advantages. For one, it seems 
to capture the ways in which perception and 
imagery are continuous. For another, it cap-
tures the intuitive picture-like phenomenology 
of at least some of perception. As we’ve seen, 
both of these were present in Fodor’s character-
ization all the way back in LOT. Hence, the 
picture principle has taken center stage in de-
bates about whether perception is distin-
guished from cognition in terms of its represen-
tational format.60 
However, given that, for Fodor, the pic-
ture principle was only supposed to apply to 
the very borders of perceptual processing, it 
is somewhat odd – and certainly not manda-
tory – to think that the form distinction is 
committed to the picture principle being a 
full characterization of perception. As I not-
ed in the previous section, while the holistic 
and dimensional representations produced 
by perceptual learning do conform to the pic-
ture principle in some respects, they do not 
do so in all respects. Whether these kinds of 
representations must be read in terms of the 
picture principle, and what this means for the 
debates surrounding the form distinction, are 
open questions. Again, this is not meant to 
overcome anyone’s arguments in the debate, 
but to show how dialectical options have 
been structured by Fodor’s views, in a way 
that is not fully exhaustive.61 
This brings us directly to the discussion of 
higher-level content. The picture principle is 
rarely explicitly cited in this debate, but it 
shapes it in a rather deep way. Many differ-
ent theorists have, at this point, posited high-
er-level contents as a way for perception to 
immediately recognize a wide-array of prop-
erties, including kind-properties,62 the moral-
ly right action in a situation,63 and natural 
scene properties.64 However, almost univer-
sally, these contents are described in discur-
sive terms – one recognizes pine trees, for in-
stance, when one sees them as pine trees. 
While sometimes higher-level content theo-
rists will consider the possibility that higher-
level contents are non-conceptual, they almost 
never take the possibility as worth much time 
to analyze.65 I think this comes from an im-
plicit assumption that non-conceptual con-
tents are most likely limited to the boundaries 
of perception, again in Fodorian spirit. 
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Of course, this set of views, if they are re-
ally committed to discursive representation 
of higher-level contents, is strongly commit-
ted to not construing the perception-
cognition border in terms of the form dis-
tinction. Again, this set of views is not really 
discussed in the debate, much to its detri-
ment. Without some distinction in mind, 
there is no way to tell whether a categorical 
representation falls on one side or other of 
the perception/cognition border.66 
The considerations offered in this section 
offer another option. I argued above that 
there are non-conceptual representations un-
derlying perceptual judgments. I’ve also ar-
gued elsewhere that perceptual learning is 
flexible enough to be decidedly non-
modular.67 But, if the considerations I’ve in-
voked here are correct, it may be possible that 
a distinct combination of non-conceptual, 
higher-level, and perceptual contents exist, 
which are produced by a non-modular pro-
cess.68 This is not a position currently consid-
ered in the debate. 
 
█  5 Conclusion 
 
As should be clear by now, I think that a 
rich role for imagistic representation in cog-
nition just is incompatible with broad-scope 
computationalism. And I think that there is 
at least suggestive evidence that non-
conceptual representation does play a rather 
rich role in the mind. If one thinks both of 
these things, then one has strong reason to 
doubt whether broad-scope computational-
ism is true. I want to conclude by just laying 
out a bit of the landscape for someone who 
holds this set of opinions. 
As it turns out, this kind of discussion is 
already at work in the debate surrounding 
embodied cognition. More modest forms of 
embodied cognition, occasionally referred to 
as “grounded” cognition, posit exactly that 
sensorimotor representations play a role in 
the kinds of functions that are traditionally 
the domain of cognition – including reason-
ing, semantics, action planning, etc. Some 
have even posited that mathematical skill in 
part relies on sensorimotor knowledge of 
how to manipulate symbols.69 
The staunchest versions of these views says 
that the entirety of these mental functions is 
done in sensorimotor representation. I think 
this is too strong; my preferred position is a hy-
brid one, on which there are both sententially 
structured representations and imagistic ones, 
and that mentation relies on both.70 This has 
been characterized by Machery as a kind of 
“narrow-scope neo-empiricism”.71 
On this kind of position, Fodor may 
largely have been right about part of the 
mind – whichever part encodes rules for rea-
soning, operates purely on discursive repre-
sentations etc. But if that is not all of the 
mind, then all kinds of fascinating dialectical 
possibilities open up. For instance, much of 
occurrent cognition may be due to the inter-
action of discursive and sensorimotor pro-
cesses, without one of them being solely re-
sponsible for much. Or, it may be that there 
are distinct forms of reasoning that happen 
solely within one or the other. 
I am partial to the first hypothesis. But 
even here, there is a huge amount of work to 
be done in considering further the nature of 
imagistic representation, what kinds of men-
tal processes (if any) can be done purely 
within that format, and how far “up” the lad-
der of cognitive sophistication these process-
es go. And work is already being done in this 
respect, about the potential for perceptual 
representation to generalize,72 and about the 
role of imagery in decision making73 and in 
skill.74 Moreover, theorizing about the inter-
action of sentential and imagistic representa-
tions opens up new possibilities for thinking 
about cognitive penetration75 and the causal 
theory of action.76 As is often the case with 
Fodor, he is at his philosophically most fruit-
ful as a foil for developing alternative views. 
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